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I. Introduction: Trilateral Approaches to ODA in South Korea 
 
As a state which successfully transitioned from a war-torn, aid-recipient country to an 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) donor country, the Republic of Korea (hereinafter, South Korea) has 
provided both grant and loan type official development assistance (ODA) to developing 
country partners for the last 30 years. However, compared to traditional DAC member 
countries, the types of ODA provided by the government of South Korea have been unique in 
introducing a Knowledge Sharing Programme (KSP) in 2004. While the KSP is basically a part 
of grant aid, both the budget holder and its operational mechanism are distinguished from the 
rest of grant aid projects in South Korea. Given this, some institutions in South Korea have 
categorized its ODA into three types: grant aid; loan aid; and KSP.  
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While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) plays the role of executive secretary to 
the grant aid providers in South Korea, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) manages 
the concessional loans, as de facto bodies of policy making for the types of grant aid and 
concessional loans. In terms of implementing bodies, excepting the Korea Export-Import Bank 
(KEXIM), more than 30 institutions, including ministries, agencies and local governments, 
provide grant aid. The KEXIM has been commissioned as the Economic Development 
Cooperation Fund (EDCF) by the MOSF as the sole body of concessional loan provision in 
South Korea. In comparison, most grant aid has been disbursed by Korea International 
Cooperation Agency (KOICA) while other ministries and agencies deal with a much lesser 
volume of grant aid. According to OECD DAC’s latest peer review on South Korea in 2012, 
the KEXIM’s EDCF (concessional loans) account for 33 percent of those drawn by the 
disbursements statistics. According to South Korea’s ODA Law, grant aid constitutes 60 
percent of the whole ODA volume in South Korea, while concessional loans take up 40 
percent.1 Here, it is noteworthy that 19 percent of grant aid has been delivered by the MOSF 
even though the MOSF is not supposed to be involved in grant aid disbursement. According to 
the aid management system architecture in South Korea, the MOSF is responsible for 
concessional loans while the MOFA controls grant aid. However, OECD DAC statistics clearly 
show that less than 20 percent of grant aid has been executed by MOSF, which is known as 
KSP. In other words, KSP has been disbursing as a proportion of grant aid since 2004, not 
controlled by MOFA but by MOSF. 
Recently, the conventional typology of ODA between grant and loan aid in South Korea 
has been on the verge of revision. KSP is not managed by the MOFA, but by the MOSF, even 
though the MOSF is not responsible for grant aid by law. Accordingly, the MOSF has delegated 
KSP activities to two main institutions in South Korea: Korea Development Institute (KDI) 
and KEXIM EDCF Department. According to MOSF, “the MOSF of the Republic of Korea 
launched the KSP, a new paradigm of development cooperation, in 2004.”2 Hence, currently 
there is a series of discussions in South Korea over whether ODA types in Korea should be 
categorized only into grant aid and concessional loans as they are now, or revised into grant 
aid, concessional loans and KSP. Furthermore, there is a group who argue that South Korea’s 
aid structure needs to be reframed as technical cooperation (TC), financial cooperation (FC) 
and KSP.3 In comparison, Japan categorizes its aid by type as TC, ODA loans and grant aid, 
while Germany categorizes theirs as FC and TC.4  
The majority of the existing literature on South Korea’s development aid focuses on 
the dichotomy of the ODA management system between grant and concessional loans.5 This 
research tends to ignore the fact that KSP is highly qualified as a unique type or model of aid, 
which exclusively depends on the developmental experience of South Korea, and does not exist 
in other OECD DAC countries 6  which heavily emphasizes the competitive relationship 
between MOFA and MOSF. At the same time, studies introducing KSP as a part of South 
Korea’s ODA7 lack this understanding of KSP as a type of ODA. These studies deal primarily 
with aid policies and systems, while some of them discuss the effectiveness of ODA projects 
operated by institutions. Yet, studies rarely compare the three aid types in South Korea, 
especially regarding why institutions select certain aid modalities. Furthermore, existing 
research that explores the motivations and policies of aid providers analyze them according to 
their different donor countries. They barely discuss how various aid institutions within a single 
nation can differ in this regard. 
In the light of this, this paper aims to fill in the gap in the existing literature by 
examining determinants of aid modalities in the main aid institutions in South Korea for the 
three aid types, by focusing on aid modality of Triangular Cooperation (TrC). In other words, 
this paper aims to answer the question of why the government of Korea has or has not delivered 
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TrC as a new aid modality. The paper focuses on the institutions of KOICA (grants), KEXIM 
EDCF (loans), and KDI with EDCF (KSP) in its comparative analysis. The definition of the 
‘determinants of aid modalities’ used in this paper differs from the one for ‘determinants of 
development aid’ itself: there are many existing studies dealing with determinants, rationales, 
or motivations of aid built upon altruistic, political, and commercial interests of each country 
at the macro level. However, this paper will argue that the factors in choosing aid modalities 
are somewhat different from the macro approaches of conventional discussion of aid 
motivations.   
This research uses TrC as an aid modality, as research on TrC in South Korea is limited. 
Most case studies dealing with TrC are found for donor countries such as Australia, Canada, 
European Union, Germany and Japan because their volume of TrC distribution is high.8 
Perhaps the reason why scholars have not explored South Korean when discussing TrC is 
because South Korea is a relatively new DAC donor in the TrC mechanism, and its volume 
invested in TrC is very low compared to that of other DAC donors. However, as the government 
of South Korea has begun to show interest in TrC in its aid regime, it is worthwhile to explore 
TrC as an aid modality in analyzing why institutions choose it as an aid type. Furthermore, it 
is a crucial factor in discussing why some institutions in South Korea face obstacles when 
increasing TrC, even though it has been widely accepted in other donor countries. In other 
words, this study attempts to analyze TrC activities as a means to investigate why three main 
aid institutions seek to increase or hesitate in their use of TrC as a new aid modality, and how 
the trilateral approaches of aid types can be differentiated in terms of the choice of aid modality 
in South Korea. 
In addition, and as discussed later in this paper, it will be interesting to look at any 
possible arrangements of TrC from South Korea to North Korea, which has yet to be broadly 
studied in the international academic community. While examining TrC profiles in South 
Korea, this research also answers to its second research question of what can be the future aid 
modality between South Korea and North Korea in the context of TrC. More specifically, this 
research attempts to investigate the implications of TrC as a new mode of aid in the context of 
South and North Korea relations. None of South Korea’s assistance to North Korea has been 
reported to the OECD DAC’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) due to domestic legislation.9 
However, as financial support to North Korea is expected to increase in the form of a revised 
version of the Sunshine Policy championed by the current South Korean government led by 
the Moon Jae-In,10 and especially based on the recent South-North Summit in April 2018,  a 
section of this paper discussing TrC from South Korea to North Korea contributes to academic 
discussions of aid support from the South to the North. It also provides implications for national 
institutions when they consider TrC as a possible effective modality towards North Korea. 
Hence, this study also attempts to examine South Korea’s assistance to North Korea through a 
third donor country within the TrC settings.  
In terms of its research methodology, this paper mainly employs a case study approach. 
While case studies can be designed with either a single case or multiple cases, this paper 
conducts a multiple case study of three aid institutions within a single country: South Korea. 
In this case study, this paper mainly uses methods such as document analysis, observation and 
interviews. As the government of South Korea has not yet provided an extensive list of its TrC 
activities, the main source of data to analyze the TrC profile can be found in documents 
prepared by aid agencies. At the same time, the research employs an observation and interview 
method for further data collection and triangulation. For example, for South Korea’s 
concessional loans, there has not yet been any official document prepared for TrC activities, 
and thus, information about any recent movement towards TrC adaptation in the concessional 
loan mechanism must be gained through observation and interview methods. A participatory 
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observation was conducted within aid agencies by “noting a phenomenon and recording it” as 
defined by Adler and Adler.11 Observation used in this paper followed the flow of events as 
Flick advises.12 At the same time, prompt individual interviews were also carried out. In doing 
so, the interviews with agency staff have been separated from the personal conversations to 
minimize any ethical concerns. Meanwhile, use of classified information or data from agencies 
has been strictly limited for the reason of transparent data use in conducting the participatory 
observation method. Yet, the fact that there are only a few sources for data collection regarding 
South Korea’s TrC activities can be considered the main limitation of this study. At the same 
time, case analysis of existing TrC towards North Korea is highly limited as there is very little 
existing literature which investigate North Korea and TrC.  
The paper is organized into five sections. Following the introductory section, Section 2 
explores recent discussions on TrC as an aid modality, while Section 3 analyses the existing 
literature on the choice of aid modalities and identifies what the main determinants are. In 
Section 4, this paper uses South Korea as a case study by analyzing its TrC activities. It will 
determine what factors are behind its choice of TrC by looking at the reaction from main aid 
agencies. In doing so, this paper investigates whether the findings from the case of South Korea 
in choosing TrC are commensurate with or show a somewhat different notion compared to the 
variables of the aid modality choice in theory. As previously mentioned, the activities of South 
Korea’s TrC towards North Korea are included in this section. Finally, in Section 5, the study 
discusses the main findings of the case study, and provides concluding remarks with theoretical 
research implications. 
 
II. Triangular Cooperation as an Aid Modality 
 
TrC is an innovative and effective aid modality in the contemporary development 
cooperation regime, and since the 2000s, aid stakeholders have increasingly adopted the TrC 
process. According to the African Union (AU), TrC activities have been broadened and 
strengthened in international development as one of the emerging modalities.13 However, as 
most of TrC literature points out, it is not a new phenomenon: the origin of TrC can be found 
in the late 1950s when the United States (U.S.) and India jointly provided assistance to Nepal 
and Afghanistan by establishing a radio network.14 Nevertheless, TrC was not an interest of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) donors until recently. TrC was internationally recognized especially by the 
third OECD DAC High Level Forum (HLF) in Accra, Ghana, in 2008, and is now “deeply” 
embedded in development activities.15 During the third HLF, aid stakeholders considered TrC 
due to its potential effectiveness compared to traditional aid modalities. As a result, it is 
becoming more popular due to its emphasis on effectiveness.16  
Although there is no internationally agreed definition of TrC, most studies adopt the 
OECD DAC definition of TrC: a partnership between an OECD DAC donor, a non-DAC donor, 
who is still a recipient country (pivotal country), and a beneficiary country (recipient 
country). 17  Some the studies delineate OECD DAC countries as traditional donors or 
industrialized countries,18  while others use pivotal countries interchangeably as emerging 
donors, emerging economies or South-South cooperation (SSC) providers.19 Pivotal countries 
generally mean those of middle income countries (MICs) who act as donors and recipients at 
the same time. As the number of MICs is increasing, DAC donors have given more interests in 
TrC.20 The terminology of TrC also varies. For instance, in much literature the authors tend to 
use the term ‘TrC’ to mean trilateral development cooperation, triangular development 
cooperation (TDC), trilateral cooperation, trilateral assistance, triangular SSC, tripartite 
cooperation, tripartite agreement or reverse linkages.21  
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As both definitions and terminologies vary, TrC is conducted in numerous ways. For 
example, according to the Secretariat of the Ibero-America, the form of ‘South-South-South’ 
is also defined as TrC,22 in comparison with ‘North-South(pivotal)-South’ format defined as 
TrC in the rest of the world. Despite the lack of clear definition or approach a common 
understanding has been formulated. For example, most of the aid stakeholders agree that a 
typical setting of TrC can be identified by the way that a DAC donor supports the existing SSC 
process between an emerging donor and a recipient country. At the same time, most of the 
literature agrees that the TrC has its advantages. 
For OECD DAC donors, TrC can increase effectiveness of aid by utilizing the better 
adaptability of pivotal countries, whose cultural, social, political, economic, geographic, 
historical or regional environments are similar to those of the beneficiary country. Pivotal 
countries also share language or cultural characteristics with beneficiary countries, which is 
not the case for DAC donors. The similarities between pivotal countries and beneficiary 
countries can increase collective understanding, which can create more realistic solutions for 
development. OECD DAC donors can also phase out their assistance to MICs by using them 
as pivotal countries. In addition, DAC donors can maximize their cost effectiveness, as experts, 
technologies or services costs in pivotal countries are less expensive. For pivotal countries, TrC 
can resolve their financial constraints as DAC donors provide funding arrangements. At the 
same time, pivotal countries can benefit from DAC donors’ aid experience in terms of capacity 
building. It is a win-win situation for all three partners in TrC.23 Through TrC, the relationship 
between the North and the South is enhanced, and thus, TrC is a primary tool for inclusive and 
innovative partnership.24 
However, like other aid modalities, TrC has also shown limitations and challenges. 
Firstly, a lack of harmonization or coordination along with increasing fragmentation among 
partners is a major obstacle of TrC.25 Secondly, high transaction costs, including coordination 
costs, have been a main drawback of TrC. A lack of institutional frameworks also results in 
high transaction costs, and therefore, it often discourages stakeholders from participating in 
TrC activities.26 Thirdly, a lack of engagement of both pivotal and beneficiary countries in 
implementing the global norms and standards, which are believed to increase development 
effectiveness, limits the imposition of TrC.27 Fourthly, difficulties in measuring the exact 
volume invested in TrC activities are a challenge, although TrC seems to be steadily 
increasing.28 Finally, the lack of diverse arrangements of TrC can discourage donors from 
participating in the process. Currently, most of the SSC activities, which are the fundamental 
structure of TrC, have been arranged with technical cooperation (TC), and there is a demand 
to create more diverse forms of TrC activities beyond TC.29 
According to OECD survey results30  from 73 out of 150 requests sent to donors, 
international organizations and recipient countries, most of the donors agree that they provide 
TrC because of the learning and sharing effects they experience with other partners engaged in 
the TrC. In addition, traditional partners seek to use the comparative advantages of SSC. On 
top of that, many OECD DAC donors to use TrC as a means to increase partnership with pivotal 
countries by supporting their SSC activities. However, only a few of the TrC providers have 
developed clear guidelines as of the time of the survey being conducted, such as Japan and 
Germany. Furthermore, the survey results are not sufficiently convincing in showing that TrC 
has been beneficial for DAC donors. While there is a robust rationale for SSC providers to 
increase the volume of TrC, such as funding from DAC donors or sharing their aid experience, 
it does not appear that DAC donors have a strong motivation for providing TrC. As previously 
mentioned, the main arrangement of the TrC has been in the TC format, therefore donors who 
are engaged in more FC do not seem to benefit from the TrC. At the same time, DAC donors 
seem to have more burdens than South-South providers in the TrC mechanisms, as there are 
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higher risks for transaction costs than traditional North-South bilateral cooperation. In other 
words, it is not strongly persuasive in explaining why donors choose TrC as a new mode of aid 
instrument, even though existing studies highlight the increasing engagement of OECD DAC 
donors in TrC mechanisms. Few studies discuss why DAC donors decide to choose TrC. For 
instance, donors can enhance bilateral partnership and dialogue within the traditional North-
South approach with SSC providers, and therefore, TrC does not seem to be such a competitive 
modality for strengthening partnership with them. 
 
III. Determinants of the Choice of Aid Modalities in Theory 
 
According to Bandstein, there is no agreed-upon definition of aid modalities.31 While 
some understand aid modalities as ‘approaches’, others describe them as ‘tools’, and yet others 
analyze them as ‘mechanisms and procedures.’ International organizations such as the World 
Bank and the OECD, define aid modalities as “approaches to delivering development 
assistance or to channeling donor support to the activities to be funded.”32 Similarly, the New 
Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID) describes aid modality as “the high-
level approach agreed between the partners to a development activity, indicating its general 
scope and where the governance, leadership, and facilitation reside.”33 While those reports 
define aid modalities as ‘approaches’, individual researchers, such as Ohno and Niiya, define 
them as “tools to transfer some aid-related money, goods and knowledge from donors to 
recipient countries.”34 On the other hand, Leader and Colenso refer to aid modality as “the 
mechanisms and procedures through which donors channel resources to countries,” in 
comparison with aid framework, which can be understood as “mechanisms through which 
donors coordinate their analysis, strategies and disbursements, with each other, with recipient 
governments and with other actors such as the UN.” 35 However, they noted that it is difficult 
to draw a clear distinction between modality and framework. Here, as most researchers use aid 
modalities, aid instruments, aid modes or aid forms interchangeably, this study also employs 
aid modalities as an equivalent thereof. 
From the existing literature dealing with the choice of aid modalities, many scholars 
have explored what kinds of aid modalities exist and how they differ, and discuss which 
modalities are appropriate. For example, Foster and Leavy analyze eight different types of aid 
modalities (balance of payments support, general budget support (GBS), aid funded debt relief, 
sectoral budget support, project aid using government systems, project aid using parallel 
systems, project aid through civil society organizations (CSOs), private providers and 
multilateral aid) drawn by three criteria (conditionality, earmarking, and disbursement channels 
and accountability).36 In comparison, Leader and Colenso categorize aid modalities, such as 
off-budget emergency projects, off-budget reconstruction projects, technical cooperation, 
social funds, budget support and sector-wide approaches (SWAps), especially in fragile 
situations.37 However, these studies do not clearly explain why or how donors decide to use 
specific aid modalities. In other words, they rarely delineate how and why donors choose those 
modalities, in spite of providing proportions of different kinds of aid modalities by donor or by 
criteria. At the same time, few studies have dealt with TrC in their aid instrument analyses or 
comparisons, even though TrC has a longer history than some of the other modalities studied.  
As Ohno and Niiya once argued, the majority of research addressing aid modalities describes 
the conditions of aid modalities, rather than analyzing how or why donors select specific 
modalities of aid.38 For instance, Tilley and Tavakoli discussed conditions for decision making 
on aid modalities, such as the degree of ownership of the poverty reduction strategy (PRS) of 
recipient government and the degree “to which donors can provide support without exerting an 
undue policy influence and how effectively development progress can be monitored”39 by 
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analyzing the British case. Their findings implied that most of the existing analysis on aid 
instruments tends to provide tools for aid modalities, such as decision trees for aid choices or 
comparison lists for strengths and weaknesses of each modality. In this sense, donors choose 
aid modalities based on “an assessment of the desired scope and relationships.”40 Otherwise, 
much of the existing literature on aid modalities analyzes the correlation between the modality 
and aid effectiveness. For example, Ouattara and Stroblhave explain that project aid modality 
has a positive impact on growth, but emphasize that it does not necessarily mean that project 
aid is a preferable method compared to other aid modalities. 41  Similarly, Furukawa and 
Takahata conducted a study on GBS and its effect on recipient countries’ health indicators, and 
provided a result showing that GBS alone does not show a significant impact on development, 
but should be combined with other aid modalities.42 Nevertheless, as Tilley and Tavakoli 
pointed out, there are “no studies that explicitly provide a framework to assist donors in 
choosing a portfolio of aid instruments.”43 On the other hand, Jelovac and Vandeninden have 
compared the impacts of both project aid and budget support, and concluded that budget 
support has a better effect on development than project aid.44 The findings of Jelovac and 
Vandeninden suggest that the impact of aid modalities coincide with recipient countries’ 
preferences. The study also suggests that project aid can still be used while boosting 
efficiency. 45  Regionally, Hino and Limi have argued that aid modality can be a critical 
determinant for aid effectiveness by region especially for comparison of Asia and Africa, even 
though their main argument lies in the role of aid in leveraging private investment.46 Although 
all of the aforementioned scholars differ as to which modality has the more positive impact on 
development, it seems that each modality has a different impact on development within 
different sets of circumstances.  
As mentioned above, the amount of literature concerning donor decision factors 
affecting aid modalities is much smaller than that regarding the effectiveness of aid modalities. 
In other words, studies addressing what the main determinants of the choice of aid modality 
are have “only emerged relatively recently.”47 Therefore, only a small number of scholars have 
attempted to analyze the determinants of the choice of aid modalities. For instance, Bandstein 
pointed out that donors do not simply choose aid modalities just because some are more 
effective than others when reviewing the existing literature on the choice of aid modalities. In 
her analysis, there are six factors which govern choosing aid modalities: international trends; 
the relationship between the partner government and the donor; the preferences of the partner 
country government; political interests; the role of the civil society and the private sector; and 
the role of the donor constituency.48 However, as the literature on the choice of aid modalities 
is highly limited, Bandstein attempted to find the main reason for choosing aid modalities, and 
demonstrated that an incentive system plays a role in the donor aid system, especially when 
deciding aid modalities. As her theory lies in an incentive system framework, she argues that 
individuals and organizations act within the incentive systems. Here, incentive means both an 
internal motivation and an external influence, and Bandstein employed “external stimuli that 
actors are facing” in her analysis.49 In more detail, as the incentive system is combined with an 
internal motivation and an external influence, both individuals and organizations which are 
influenced by external and internal factors work under the incentive system. However, in her 
argument, it is somewhat unclear how the incentive system correlates with the decision-making 
mechanism for aid modalities within the six factors. At the same time, Booth and Fritz claimed 
that not only incentives within the system, but also the institutional arrangements influence the 
choice of aid modalities. 50  Thus, this paper has reviewed the existing literature, and re-
organized the categorization of the factors influencing donor choice on aid modalities into three 
pillars: 1) norms and trends at the international level; 2) domestic political environment at the 
donor country level; and 3) circumstances at the recipient country level. 
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3.1 Norms and Trends at the International Level 
Donors show a tendency to choose aid modalities in accordance with the contemporary 
international guidelines. For example, in the 1980s, along with the structural adjustment 
approach, donor society was strongly required to use budget support.51 In the late 1990s, a new 
aid modality called SWAp was adopted by donors in contrast with project aid.52 Since 2005, 
when the Paris Declaration (PD) was agreed upon by international aid stakeholders during the 
second OECD DAC HLF on aid effectiveness, both budget support and SWAp have merged 
into programme-based approach (PBA). Planning for the PD implementation lasted from 2005 
to 2010, and the donor society was under pressure to increase their use of PBAs. For instance, 
the OECD DAC peer review asked whether a donor was effective or not in terms of its aid 
delivery efficiency by monitoring donor implementation of the PBAs as one of the review 
criteria in the effectiveness session.53 Similarly, when the Accra Agenda for Action was agreed 
upon during the third HLF of the OECD DAC in 2008, donors began to consider wider use of 
TrC, especially in support of the SSC, as a new aid modality.54 At the same time, since the final 
HLF was held in Busan in 2011, the OECD DAC has amended its peer review reference guide 
in accordance with the new global norm of the Busan Global Partnership,55 and thus donors are 
now under pressure to adopt a new movement in the international development cooperation 
paradigm. For instance, as the Busan HLF outcome document demonstrates, global aid 
stakeholders officially adopted the private sector as a key player in development, and both the 
OECD and UN have highlighted the role of innovative financing methods in ODA as 
mobilizing private flows in developing countries.  
 
3.2 Domestic Political Environment at the Donor Country Level 
Donors are heavily influenced by their domestic political environment when deciding 
what kinds of aid instruments to implement. For instance, Dodsworth has looked at the factors 
for donor decision on aid modalities, and discovered that donor self-interest and domestic 
policies affect the decision process for aid modalities.56 Accordingly, it can be assumed that 
the aid modality choice mechanism is related to the motivations of donors. However, few 
studies have specifically answered the question why donors at an organizational level choose 
certain kinds of modalities in countries in relation to the donor’s motivations. From the existing 
literature, it seems that donor organizations are heavily influenced by government level 
motivations. For instance, Lim argues that KOICA tends to provide aid based on political and 
diplomatic motivations influenced by the MOFA, while KEXIM EDCF is heavily occupied by 
commercial motivation as the MOSF emphasizes economic cooperation between South Korea 
and recipient partners.57 
 
3.3 Circumstances at the Recipient Country Level 
Ohno and Niiya illustrate that “various aid modalities have evolved in response to 
emerging development priorities.”58 In the light of this, Ohno and Niiya explain that donor aid 
modality choice has shown a nexus with priority problems in recipient countries within the 
Development Priority Matrix (DPM) framework.59 They show how DPM can be used by 
donors in accordance with priority problems in recipient countries. For example, if the main 
problems in recipient countries are related to technical solutions, donors can decide to provide 
project aid in this case. In this sense, they argue that it is important to identify priority problems 
in recipient countries before making decisions on aid modalities in donor countries. In addition, 
they have emphasized the importance of understanding contextual differences for the choice of 
aid modalities as well as country needs and ownership. Similarly, Booth and Fritz have implied 
that donors should consider the recipient country’s situation, such as governance and political 
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systems, when choosing aid modalities, even though their study does not focus on the 
determinants of the choice of aid modalities. According to them, “what we are saying about 
governance is directly consistent with what we have argued about aid modalities.”60 In the case 
of Foster and Leavy, their research findings imply that recipient country circumstances can 
influence the donor decision-making process on aid modality although they seemingly fail to 
demonstrate what factors shape the choice of aid modalities.61 Similarly, both Cordella and 
Dell’Ariccia62 and Hefeker63 discuss how each aid modality can be appropriate under certain 
conditions in the recipient country. For example, Cordella and Dell’Ariccia conclude that 
project aid can be more effective when the recipient country has fewer resources and 
developmental preferences while budget support can be more effective when the recipient 
country has greater resources and preferences.64 However, from the findings of both Cordella 
and Dell’Ariccia65 and Hefeker66 it is unclear whether those circumstances have influenced 
donors when deciding aid modalities. In comparison, Clist, Isopi and Morrissey claim that 
donors decide to provide budget support when the recipient country has a PRS, since it works 
as an indicator of government efficiency. Besides, they argue, donors incorporate the 
“efficiency of recipient spending” along with selectivity when they choose one modality over 
another.67  
 
 
IV. Triangular Cooperation activities in South Korea 
 
According to the last OECD DAC survey in 2012, South Korea was the lowest ranked 
in terms of TrC providers mentioned by developing countries. In comparison, Japan and 
Germany were the two top bilateral providers of TrC. South Korea was recorded as a provider 
group of between one and ten in terms of TrC activities, while Germany provided between ten 
and 50 TrC activities. When it comes to the amount of TrC volume, Japan was one of the top 
two providers, reporting more than USD 50 million, and Germany followed, recording 
reporting between USD ten million and 50 million. South Korea’s annual contribution to TrC 
was estimated at less than USD one million.68 However, it is somewhat unclear whether the 
OECD DAC surveyed all of the 30 ministries and agencies that provide ODA in South Korea. 
There is a high possibility that the OECD DAC survey results against South Korea could be 
responded to only by KOICA as it is the main agency for TC activities, considering that the 
main instruments for TrC composed of TC. Besides, as the number of KOICA’s TrC activities 
(see Table 2 later in this section) seems to be identical with what OECD DAC’s survey shows 
(Table 1), this paper argues that there are more activities of TrC by other institutions in South 
Korea, which will be discussed later in this paper. In other words, while both OECD DAC 
survey on TrC69 and KOICA’s documents identify that there are less than ten TrC activities in 
South Korea, there are more than ten cases of TrC in actuality.  
 
Table 1. OECD DAC’s survey result of the estimated total number of Triangular Cooperation 
activities per donor and international organization 
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N.B.: As there is not a consensual definition of what is a TrC initiative, respondents reported the number of 
initiatives they have participated in according to their own definitions. 
Source: Adapted from OECD, 2013b, p. 20 
 
 
Judging by the comment provided in the OECD DAC TrC survey report, the survey includes 
KOICA as the only agency for TrC when it comes to South Korea. As stated in the report, 
South Korea was establishing guidelines for TrC at the time of being surveyed, and there was 
only one agency (KOICA) out of more than 30 institutions in South Korea which was planning 
to provide TrC guidelines. Accordingly, it is necessary to investigate other institutions’ TrC 
activities in South Korea as well in a more in-depth manner.  
 
4.1 Grant Aid Triangular Cooperation of KOICA 
KOICA published a TrC guideline at the end of 2013 and began to disseminate it within 
the headquarters and country offices in 2014. According to the guideline, KOICA pursues three 
models of TrC as described in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Triangular Cooperation models of KOICA 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Own Compilation based on Korea International Cooperation Agency [KOICA], 2013, p. 21 
 
As seen above, KOICA does not use the term ‘pivotal country’. Instead, it prefers to use 
‘partner country’, which is equivalent to pivotal country in the DAC definition. First of all, in 
the form of TrC Model 1, both KOICA and the partner country design TrC activities together 
from the beginning. At the same time, KOICA and the partner country provide joint activity to 
the beneficiary country based on co-funding and co-activities. TrC activities under this model 
have been provided in the form of joint training. Secondly, under KOICA’s TrC Model 2, the 
partner country initiates TrC activities while KOICA provides in-kind or technical cooperation 
to the partner country. In this model, the partner country is expected to provide TrC activities 
to multiple beneficiary countries, not to one country. KOICA normally shares technology, 
finance, and human resources. Finally, for KOICA’s TrC Model 3, KOICA continues its 
existing activities towards beneficiary countries, whereas it additionally utilizes the partner 
country’s expertise and logistical advantages.70 During the TrC categorization process, KOICA 
listed its TrC activities as in Table 2. As illustrated in Table 2, KOICA has conducted only a 
few TrC activities, which are possibly included in the OECD DAC TrC Survey in 2012. 
 
Table 2. Triangular Cooperation activities provided by KOICA 
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Source: Author’s Own Compilation based on Korea International Cooperation Agency [KOICA], 2013, p. 45 
 
 
While TrC is not mainstream in KOICA yet, KOICA has planned to increase TrC activities in 
its project profile since the end of 2013. However, the main reasons why KOICA chooses to 
provide the TrC modality are different from team to team. For example, the Strategy Planning 
Team distributed the ‘KOICA Triangular Cooperation Guideline’ to the relevant teams in its 
headquarters and country offices in order to comply with international norms. According to the 
guideline, KOICA expects to increase its aid effectiveness throughout TrC activities in the 
context of increasing the partner country’s ownership and mutual accountability.71 However, 
it does not seem that KOICA has highly increased TrC since 2013, either in terms of number 
of projects or volume of aid.  
According to the staff members in the Central and Latin America Team, KOICA had 
fewer interests in the Central and Latin America region due to the lower volume of aid to the 
Latin America region when it began to implement TrC.72 KOICA’s TrC activities have mostly 
targeted a limited number of countries such as Mexico (pivotal), Chile (pivotal), Thailand 
(pivotal), Turkey (pivotal), various Caribbean countries (recipient) and developing countries 
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) group (recipient).73 The reason why 
KOICA provides TrC to those particular countries is to increase aid effectiveness by 
customizing the context of aid for the recipient end throughout pivotal partners.74 In other 
words, the main advantage of TrC, which uses regional, cultural and language similarities 
between SSC provider and the beneficiary country, has been one of the main reasons for 
KOICA to choose TrC.75 On the other hand, the reason why TrC has not sufficiently increased 
in KOICA is the high level of administrative costs and a lack of monitoring and evaluation 
mechanism for TrC modality.76 In comparison, MOFA does not seem to have a clear approach 
to TrC yet. 
Based on the above analysis, this paper argues that the main factor or rationale for 
providing TrC in KOICA is the nature of TrC, as it is much easier to customize the context of 
aid delivery in terms of the needs of the recipient country due to the better understanding of 
the pivotal country of the end beneficiary. In this sense, the reason why KOICA chooses TrC 
as one of the aid modalities is also due to the circumstances in recipient countries. While 
KOICA implemented TrC partially due to the international norms and trends, it is not because 
of the domestic political environment in South Korea. 
 
4.2 Concessional Loan Triangular Cooperation of KEXIM EDCF 
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The KEXIM EDCF has not yet actively engaged in TrC activities. However, while 
preparing for the business summit of the 2015 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and 
Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) Annual Meeting of the Boards of Governors in 
Busan, South Korea, the EDCF department first reviewed TrC activities as the initial agenda 
for the business summit, for the first time in the EDCF’s 30-year history. The discussion 
centered on how to promote TrC activities among concessional loan providers and multilateral 
development banks in the form of Asia-Latin America partnerships. As the EDCF recognizes 
that TrC arrangements are mainly based on TC activities, it has attempted to find out how 
partners can engage in TrC based on concessional loan provisions. Accordingly, EDCF intends 
to propose a new model of TrC, which combines infrastructure projects within concessional 
loan provision from South Korea to Latin American pivotal countries, while they themselves 
are expected to provide KSP to neighboring beneficiary countries. Many MICs in South 
America have received KSP projects from South Korea. As the KSP team at the MOSF is 
planning to provide TrC activities throughout KSP, the EDCF is expected to increase its 
engagement in the TrC process in the future. At the same time, MOSF conducted a study to 
discover how the EDCF can more actively engage in TrC activities with other South-South 
providers.77 However, findings from this research project have not yet been shared with the 
public. At the same time, the reason why the EDCF has not sufficiently increased its TrC is 
because of the nature of concessional loans, which are high volume and require interest 
payments. As discussed, TrC tends to be delivered within relatively low volume activities. 
This demonstrates that the reason why the EDCF is willing to introduce TrC is partially 
due to international trends as it was required to participate in the discussion of how to promote 
TrC with partners. At the same time, it can be shown that the EDCF is under pressure to deliver 
TrC by its domestic political environment, in accordance with the recent interests of the MOSF. 
However, there was no indication of considering the recipient country’s circumstances, 
whereas there was discussion between the EDCF and South-South providers at some level. 
Furthermore, due to the nature of the modality itself, it has been difficult for the EDCF to adopt 
TrC mechanism in its operation as TrC is highly a TC-like modality, which limits the function 
of loan distribution mechanisms.   
 
4.3 KSP Triangular Cooperation of KDI 
As a main institute of the KSP, KDI has shown its record of TrC activities. Currently, 
the KSP is composed of three pillars: 1) policy consultation and system consulting (KSP Model 
1); 2) joint consultation with MDBs (KSP Model 2); and 3) modularization of Korea’s 
development experience (KSP Model 3). While both KSP Model 1 and Model 3 are provided 
based on bilateral partnership, KSP Model 2 is performed as a multilateral partnership. Among 
these, KSP Model 2 is delivered by the EDCF while Model 3 is managed by KDI. Both the 
EDCF and KDI deal with parts of Model 1 (Ministry of Strategy and Finance of the Republic 
of Korea [MOSF], 2012). Accordingly, the EDCF’s KSP is not involved in the TrC mechanism 
at all as their activities are binding to the bilateral activities only. 
Even before its inception of KSP in 2004, KDI used to provide knowledge sharing (KS) 
projects, and some of them were given to North Korea, as shown in Table 3. However, when 
the government of South Korea officially created KSP and merged most of the existing 
mechanisms of KS projects into this format, KDI undertook no more KSP activities towards 
North Korea. At the same time, the KSP has limited its activities by binding to the 
aforementioned three models, and the existing practices of KDI in the KS patterns are 
terminated. Thus, Table 3 includes KS activities from KDI to North Korea until 2003, and the 
subsequent years until 2010 include other government sectors’ KS activities in South Korea. 
While current KSP does not allow the use of TrC arrangements, there will be increasing needs 
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for TrC through KSP as the MOSF is reviewing future directions of KSP through TrC.78  
 
Table 3. Knowledge sharing projects from South Korea to North Korea through Triangular 
Cooperation 
 
 
 
* TrC KS projects providers in South Korea include only public sector, and exclude any private participants. 
N.B.: Record after 2011 is not publicly available. 
Source: Author’s Own Compilation based on Moon, 2014, pp. 44-45 
 
The reason why KDI provided its KS projects through a third country was because of the 
limited accessibility to North Korea and the unique situation between South and North Korea. 
KDI selected TrC-like activities with pivotal countries, which were located near North Korea 
or maintained adequate diplomatic relationships with North Korea. Not only that, there was an 
increasing need in North Korea for market economy training and education through TC and 
KS.79 However, it is noteworthy that some contend that KDI’s TrC activities towards North 
Korea are a part of South Korea’s ODA as the government of South Korea does not recognize 
North Korea as an independent sovereign state by the Third Amendment of the Constitution. 
In fact, none of the assistance from any South Korean public sector to North Korea has been 
recorded as ODA, such as Inter-Korea Cooperation Fund (IKCF). The IKCF involves most of 
South Korea government’s official support to North Korea-related aid activities. Likewise, the 
OECD DAC’s Development Cooperation Report series repeatedly states that South Korea does 
not report its aid to North Korea, thus it is not possible to provide any statistics for South 
Korea’s ODA to North Korea.80 However, if South Korea sends out its ODA to other recipients 
which use it as a support to North Korea, it may be recorded as ODA. As this is a basic 
mechanism of TrC, South Korea will be able to use its ODA to support North Korea by using 
TrC.  
At the same time, others may claim that KDI and other government institutions’ KS 
activities before 2010 are not TrC, as South Korea was still a recipient country during the period. 
However, this paper argues that KDI’s KS activities towards North Korea before 2004 (when 
KSP was established) and other ministries’ KS support to North Korea before 2010 (when 
Korea became a DAC member state) through a third country (pivotal country) can be viewed 
as TrC activities of South Korea. Firstly, as Moon once argued, KDI funneled its assistance to 
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North Korea through the TrC process, and therefore, the amount of ODA provided to pivotal 
countries could have been reported to CRS as ODA despite the end beneficiary being North 
Korea.81 This is because South Korea did not directly provide its ODA to North Korea in 
bilateral arrangements. There has not yet been any counter argument raised within South 
Korea’s academic community against this. This could be because aid data from South Korea 
to North Korea is highly limited, and there have been few studies conducted in terms of TrC 
from South Korea to North Korea. Second, other institutions’ KS activities to North Korea 
through a third country before 2010 can also be TrC by adoption of the definition of Secretariat 
Ibero-America (South-South-South), as mentioned at the beginning of this paper. Therefore, 
KDI and other institutions in South Korea have provided assistance to North Korea through the 
TrC process as KS activities. 
Given this, it can be said that KDI’s TrC in the form of KSP coincides with the domestic 
political environment and the circumstances of the recipient country; however, not with the 
international norms and trends. Similar to EDCF, the rationale behind choosing TrC in KDI is 
also due to the nature of the modality. As TrC can be highly effective when traditional donors 
provide aid through the pivotal country where the regional, cultural or even political notions 
are similar to those of the recipient country. As the government of South Korea had limited 
access to North Korea, the only route was to provide TrC through countries like Russia and 
China. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
According to the theory of the choice of aid modalities, a classical approach to 
understanding the rationale behind the choice of aid modalities consists of three pillars: 
international norms and trends; donors’ domestic political environment; and the circumstances 
in recipient countries. Based on the findings of the study, this paper argues that the main 
determinants for the choice of aid modalities do not always fall into these three categories. The 
case of South Korea shows that there are more than three variables in choosing aid modalities 
in donor countries, especially at the level of organizations regarding the types of aid. Findings 
in this paper suggest more variables against existing theories: consideration of the nature of 
modality which has high influence on decision-making process; and unintended circumstances 
which interfere the decision-making process. 
In the case of KOICA, it has introduced TrC to comply with the international norms 
and trends. At the same time, in an attempt to consider the circumstances of the beneficiary 
country, KOICA discovered that TrC can be effective as it can provide a more customized 
means of support. The result has been that the donor country considers the nature of the 
modality itself a decision-making process. It does not seem that KOICA’s choice of TrC is 
affected by its domestic political environment; however, some of the rationale behind the 
choice of TrC can be found in the context of compliance with international norms and trends. 
As with KOICA, EDCF also showed that the reason why it was willing to introduce TrC in the 
organization was due to these international norms and trends; however, it has not implemented 
the TrC as the nature of the modality does not allow for both donor and recipient to utilize it. 
While KOICA does not consider the domestic political environment when deciding to choose 
TrC, EDCF was under pressure domestically by the MOSF. At the same time, EDCF has not 
shown any sign of considering the circumstances of the recipient country.  
In comparison, KDI has provided TrC due to the beneficiary country’s circumstances 
as well as the domestic political environment. However, KDI’s use of TrC was not deliberate. 
This paper has shown that KDI had no choice but to provide KS projects through a third party 
to North Korea due to the limited accessibility to and increasing need for training and education 
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opportunities in North Korea. In the case of KDI, using TrC was rather conducted 
coincidentally, not decisively, due to the unique conditions of assistance to North Korea. By 
using Russia or China as pivotal countries, South Korea could provide KSP to North Korea, 
and in this triangular system, the nature of TrC itself benefited all three parties. Here, this can 
imply that the new government of South Korea can consider the advantage of TrC as an aid 
modality when it revises the old Sunshine Policy and the IKCF.  
When current United Nations (UN) sanctions against North Korea are eased, and when 
aid donors begin to provide ODA to North Korea, South Korea’s IKCF will not be categorized 
as ODA due to the constitutional law unless a Peace Treaty or the end of current Armistice 
Agreement comes with a change of South Korea’s constitutional amendment that allows or 
accepts North Korea as an independent sovereign state. Currently, TrC seems to be the only 
way for South Korea to seek another route to engage in the development process as a twin 
country. In this sense, using TrC mechanism with other South donor countries such as China, 
Russia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand, or with international organizations which involves 
South donor countries with development projects within the region, such as the Greater Tumen 
Initiative (GTI), will be able to bring more efficient approach to maximize aid effectiveness 
towards North Korea. However, this issue needs to be discussed further in the following studies 
to seek an effective way of supporting North Korea in peaceful and mutually cooperative 
dynamics among the three parties. At the same time, TrC as a means of leveraging poor 
relations between South and North Korea can be also examined in further research projects. 
In conclusion, this study argues that the nature of aid modalities in terms of both 
advantages and limitations is a practical factor in the choice of modalities by aid donors. The 
theory shows the norms and trends at the international level, the domestic political environment 
at the donor country level, and the circumstances of the recipient country, are the rationale for 
aid modality. Whereas the above analysis shows that the main determinants for the choice of 
aid modality in the case of TrC in South Korea are, to some extent, in line with the theory, the 
South Korean case illustrates that a consideration of the nature of modality also influences the 
decision. Both KOICA and KDI employed TrC by considering the advantages in terms of 
utilizing regional, cultural, linguistic, or political ties between the South-South partners, while 
the EDCF has faced practical limitations in using TrC because TrC is normally imposed based 
on TC conditions, not with FC conditions. Furthermore, the study also discovered that 
unintended circumstances can interfere with the decision-making process when choosing aid 
modalities, from the case of KDI’s KS projects to North Korea. The findings of this paper 
imply that the theory is not fully commensurate with actual practices in the aid regime. Based 
on South Korea choosing TrC as a new aid modality, the study suggests that there can be 
various determinants in choosing aid modalities depending on the surrounding circumstances.  
This, in turn, implies that more case studies need to be conducted and compared in order 
to theoretically conceptualize practical approaches into academic discussions. Furthermore, a 
series of separate research projects regarding TrC should be conducted, in order to develop an 
effective support mechanism from South Korea to North Korea in revising the old Sunshine 
Policy in President Moon Jae-In’s administration, or even in the following government. In the 
end, as seen from the case of KDI, TrC can be a highly plausible modality in fragile contexts, 
such as in North Korea, and thus, an in-depth study is required in search of enhancing TrC 
mechanisms in fragile states.  
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